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I. Introduction
Insider trading has long been debated in law and economics literature. 1 The
central question is whether insider trading is efficiency-improving or efficiency-reducing
for firms and the stock market as a whole. At the market level, the debate concerns the
effect of insider trading on characteristics of the stock market, such as stock market
liquidity and volatility and stock price efficiency or accuracy. The relevant question here
is whether insider trading enhances or reduces stock market efficiency. At the firm level,
the debate focuses on the impact of insider trading on the intra-firm agency conflict, the
classic conflict of interest between managers or controlling shareholders (the agents) and
non-controlling shareholders (the principals). 2 The salient question at the firm level is
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For a summary of the debate, see Beny (2007a); Bainbridge (1999).
2
See Jensen and Meckling (1976) for description of the agency conflict and agency costs.
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whether insider trading ameliorates or worsens this conflict. This article focuses on the
impact of insider trading on the agency conflict within the firm. 3
The impact of insider trading on the intra-firm agency conflict is an important
issue because it raises the weighty corollary question of who ought to monitor and
regulate insider trading: the government, via a blanket prohibition of insider trading,
versus firms and shareholders, via private contracting. There are three major views on
the impact of insider trading on the agency conflict. The first position is that insider
trading mitigates this conflict and therefore insider trading regulation reduces intra-firm
efficiency. (Carlton and Fischel 1983). In contrast, the second position holds that insider
trading exacerbates the agency conflict and consequently insider trading regulation
promotes intra-firm efficiency. (e.g., Cox 1986; Manove 1989; Kraakman 1991; Klock
1994; Maug 2002).
The third position straddles the fence, maintaining that the effect of insider
trading on the agency conflict is indeterminate and varies across firms. Nevertheless,
according to proponents of the third view, private contracting is superior to insider
trading regulation because private parties are more capable than the government of
assessing the effect of insider trading on the corporation. (see, e.g., Haddock and Macey
1987; Epstein 2004). 4 Private contracting will promote varied and efficient responses to
insider trading across firms. According to those who espouse the third view, firms in

3

See, e.g., Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) for evidence of the effects of insider trading and/or
insider trading regulation on stock markets as a whole.
4
Carlton and Fischel (1983) may also be categorized under the third view because they consider the
possibility that insider trading harms the firm by reducing liquidity of the firm’s shares. But they
ultimately dismiss this possibility by arguing that if it were true, we would have observed firms voluntarily
banning insider trading before it became illegal in the United States.
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which insider trading exacerbates the agency conflict will prohibit insider trading, while
firms in which insider trading mitigates the agency conflict will permit insider trading.
Although law and economics scholars have long stressed the need for empirical
evidence on the impact of insider trading on the intra-firm agency conflict (see, e.g.,
Carlton and Fischel 1983 and Easterbrook 1985), there were few empirical studies on this
topic until recently. 5 Because insider trading is illegal in virtually every country with a
public stock market (Bhattacharya and Daouk 2002), it is impossible to conduct a direct
empirical test of whether insider trading exacerbates the agency conflict and whether
private contracting is superior to a mandatory ban. 6 However, we can assess these issues
indirectly by exploiting cross-country variation in the strength of insider trading laws and
enforcement. 7 If insider trading exacerbates the agency conflict, we would expect insider
trading regulation (assuming it is effective) to be associated with higher corporate value
because corporate value is a proxy for agency costs. (Morck, et. al. 1988). 8 This article
investigates the latter proposition by examining the relationship between the strength of a
country’s insider trading laws and corporate value.
5

The main evidence adduced by opponents of insider trading regulation in support of their
deregulatory position is the historical survival of insider trading in the United States prior to the enactment
of insider trading rules, without any apparent attempt by private parties to prohibit insider trading. (Carlton
and Fischel 1983). According to Carlton and Fischel (1983), this evidence suggests that shareholders did
not perceive insider trading to exacerbate the agency conflict because, if they had, they would have
prohibited insiders from trading long before the legislature and the courts preempted the issue. In response,
Judge Easterbrook (1985) argues that the historical survival of insider trading in the United States may
have meant merely that the cost of such contracting was too high, not that shareholders had no desire to
prohibit insider trading. (Easterbrook 1985; see also Cox 1986). Recent empirical studies on insider
trading laws and enforcement include Ackerman and Maug (2006); Beny (2005, 2007a); Bhattacharya and
Daouk (2002, 2005); Bris (2005); and Durnev and Nain (2005). All of these recent studies provide
evidence on the cross-country implications of insider trading laws and enforcement.
6
Also, the near-universal illegality of insider trading arguably places the burden on opponents of
insider trading regulation to show that such regulation is more costly than beneficial, since they seek to
change the current status quo.
7
This is not possible at the domestic level unless, like Canada, a country exhibits state/provincial
variation in its insider trading laws and enforcement, or unless one uses time series data for a single country
that span periods before and after the enactment of insider trading legislation.
8
See Jensen and Meckling (1976) for the original formulation of agency costs.
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Based on a simple agency model of corporate value diversion through insider
trading by a controlling shareholder, I derive two empirically testable hypotheses about
the relationship between corporate value and insider trading laws: (1) more stringent
insider trading laws increase firm value by reducing the controlling shareholder’s
incentive to divert corporate value through insider trading and (2) more stringent insider
trading laws and an increase in the controlling shareholder’s financial stake in the firm
are substitute means to mitigate the agency conflict. I test these hypotheses using firmlevel data from a cross-section of large firms from twenty-seven developed countries.
This article’s central finding is that stronger insider trading laws and enforcement are
associated with higher corporate valuation for the firms in common law countries, but not
for the firms in civil law countries. 9
Part II of this article provides an overview of existing law, economics, and
finance literature that characterizes insider trading as an agency issue and presents the
two hypotheses. Part III describes the data and presents descriptive statistics. Part IV
outlines the empirical methodology and presents the regression results. Part V addresses
the robustness of the results. Finally, Part VI concludes.
II.

Prior Literature and Hypotheses
This Part summarizes prior literature characterizing insider trading as an agency

issue and presents two empirically testable hypotheses.
A.

Insider Trading Ameliorates the Agency Conflict between Managers
and Shareholders

9

I do not find that cash flow ownership and insider trading laws are substitute means to control
agency costs within the firm. If anything, my evidence suggests that insider trading laws and ownership are
complementary ways to mitigate agency costs, although this result is generally statistically insignificant.

3
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Manne (1966) was the first legal scholar to point out the potential beneficial role
of insider trading as a form of compensation. In Insider Trading and the Stock Market,
he argues that insider trading is valuable to firms because it motivates insiders to be more
entrepreneurial. According to Manne (1966), “entrepreneurs” within the firm, and their
productive output, are difficult to identify ex ante. Thus, if corporate insiders’
compensation is set in advance, it will be inefficient because it will not be calibrated to
their ex post entrepreneurial activity. In contrast, when corporate insiders are allowed to
engage in insider trading, they will be rewarded (via insider trading profits) in direct
proportion to and contemporaneously with their innovations. In this manner, insider
trading can maximize insiders’ incentives to innovate and thereby improve corporate
performance.
Carlton and Fischel (1983) recast Manne’s (1966) efficient compensation thesis
within the modern framework of agency and contract theory. In their view, capital and
product markets do not adequately discipline or incentivize managers because these
markets work imperfectly. Ex ante compensation contracts are also deficient because
they often require costly “periodic renegotiations ex post based on (imperfectly) observed
effort and output.” (Carlton and Fischel 1983, 869).
In contrast, insider trading enables managers to continually update their
compensation in light of new information without incurring renegotiation costs. Insider
trading increases managers’ incentives by linking their “fortunes more closely to those of
the firm.” (Carlton and Fischel 1983, 877). More specifically, insider trading aligns
managers’ and shareholders’ interests by allowing managers to profit from the increase in

4
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firm value caused by their efforts. 10 Carlton and Fischel (1983) also argue that insider
trading improves the managerial labor market by reducing firms’ screening and
monitoring costs, 11 because the most capable and least risk averse managers will selfselect into the firms that permit insider trading.
The theoretical economics and finance literature also contains several accounts of
insider trading as a mechanism to reduce the agency conflict within the firm. Dye (1984)
uses a mathematical model to prove Carlton and Fischel’s (1983) claim that insider
trading may increase shareholder wealth by better aligning manager and shareholder
interests than standard earnings-contingent contracts. Bebchuk and Fershtman show that
insider trading may enhance corporate value by increasing managers’ effort levels
(Bebchuk and Fershtman 1993) or by causing them to select risky but profitable
investment projects that otherwise would be rejected if they were not allowed to trade on
inside information. (Bebchuk and Fershtman, 1994). The mathematical proofs of these
propositions formalize Carlton and Fischel’s (1983) non-technical arguments. Finally,
Noe (1997) demonstrates with a formal model that, even if insider trading does not
increase insiders’ effort levels, it may cost firms less (i.e., involve lower managerial
rents) than standard compensation contracts because of a “substitution effect between
explicit managerial compensation and insider trading” profits. (Noe 1997, 311). That is,
when managers engage in insider trading, firms pay them lower salaries. 12

10

In response, opponents of insider trading argue that managers can also profit from corporate
failures that they have caused by taking short positions in their firms’ stocks. See Part II.B below.
11
Lower screening and monitoring costs imply lower agency costs.
12
Roulstone confirms the existence of a substitution effect between insider trading and total
compensation: “firms that restrict when insiders can trade pay a 4% to 13% premium in total compensation
relatives to firms that do not restrict insider trading, after controlling for economic determinants of
compensation.” (Roulstone 2003, p. 526).
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B.

Insider Trading Exacerbates the Agency Conflict between Managers
and Shareholders

Some law and economics scholars argue that, rather than aligning shareholder and
manager interests, insider trading may exacerbate the agency conflict. Kraakman (1991)
argues that, through insider trading, managers may be able, ex post, to sabotage an
efficient ex ante compensation contract and thereby counteract performance-based
compensation schemes intended to calibrate pay to productivity. (Kraakman 1991).
Cox (1986) argues that it is very difficult in practice to ensure that those who
create valuable information (i.e., entrepreneurial innovations) are the only ones within the
firm who are able to profit from it. To the extent that the firm’s “true” entrepreneurs
cannot exclude other insiders from profiting on the positive information, their incentives
to innovate will be reduced rather than increased. Furthermore, the non-excludability of
insider trading profits may cause the firm’s “true” entrepreneurs to conceal their
information to monopolize insider trading profits, and thus reduce the flow of
information and productive efficiency within the firm. (Haft 1982).
Some legal scholars also argue that allowing managers to trade on inside
information may give them incentives to take on too much risk or to undertake projects
that reduce corporate value. Because insider trading is more profitable when stock prices
are more volatile, insider trading may encourage managers to undertake excessively risky
projects (to increase volatility) that would create private opportunities for profitable
insider trading but that would reduce corporate value. (Kraakman 1991). In addition,
because managers can profit from insider trading regardless of corporate performance,
insider trading may increase managers’ incentive to under-perform by making them
indifferent between good and bad corporate performance. (Anabtawi 1989; Kraakman

6
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1991; Klock 1994). If corporate insiders are permitted to sell the firm’s shares short, the
potential problems of excessive risk-taking 13 and compensation unbundling induced by
insider trading may be worsened. (Klock 1994).
Several theoretical economics and finance articles also demonstrate that insider
trading may worsen the agency conflict between managers and shareholders. Manove
formally demonstrates how insider trading can reduce corporate value by discouraging
investment because corporate insiders “with private information are able to appropriate
some part of the returns to corporate investments…at the expense of other shareholders.”
(Manove 1989, 823). 14 If shareholders suspect such appropriation, they will favor a
reduction in corporate investment. Bebchuk and Fershtman (1990) show that insider
trading may increase managers’ incentive to “waste” corporate value by encouraging
them to make decisions that maximize their potential trading profits rather than corporate
value.
C.

Insider Trading has an Indeterminate Impact on the Agency Conflict
between Managers and Shareholders

As noted above, some scholars are agnostic about whether insider trading is
harmful to the firm and suggest that the effect of insider trading probably varies across
firms. (Haddock and Macey 1987; Epstein 2004).
D.

Dominant Shareholders: Insider Trading and Monitoring

Another strand of insider trading literature addresses the impact of insider trading
in the context where there is a dominant (controlling) shareholder in the firm. By virtue
of their controlling position, large shareholders have greater access to corporate
13

In response, some legal scholars argue that insider trading mitigates managers’ excessive risk
aversion. Cartlon and Fischel (1983).
14
Douglas (1989) also shows that the information asymmetry due to insider trading transfers wealth
from shareholders to insiders.
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management and, as a result, to material, non-public information. Thus, like managers,
they can earn greater profits from trading than small shareholders. There are two
conflicting views about the impact of insider trading on controlling shareholders’
incentives to monitor managers. 15
Demsetz and Bhide argue that insider trading increases controlling shareholders’
incentives to monitor managers. Controlling shareholders are beneficial to firms, they
argue, because these shareholders have greater incentives to monitor managers (and thus
to mitigate the manager-shareholder agency conflict) than small, dispersed shareholders
who face collective action problems. However, holding a concentrated ownership
position imposes risks on the dominant shareholder, in particular the risks of holding an
undiversified portfolio. (Demsetz 1986; Bhide 1993). Thus, controlling shareholders
must be compensated both for assuming the risks of concentrated ownership and for
monitoring managers. (Demsetz 1986; Bhide 1993). Demsetz and Bhide argue that
insider trading profits are a convenient way to compensate controlling shareholders for
these activities. (Demsetz 1986; Bhide 1993). Restricting insider trading may therefore
have a negative impact on corporate value by reducing controlling shareholders’
incentives to monitor by raising the costs and liabilities of active shareholding. (Demsetz
1986; Bhide 1993).
In contrast, Maug (2002) suggests that insider trading may adversely affect
controlling shareholders’ incentives to monitor managers. In Maug’s view, large
shareholders may use their dominance in the service of their own (and managers’)
interests at the expense of small shareholders if they are permitted to engage in insider

15

See Jensen and Meckling (1976); Demsetz (1986); Shleifer and Vishny (1986); Bhide (1993).

8
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art61

10

Beny:

trading. 16 Using a mathematical model, Maug shows how insider trading can induce
large shareholders to expropriate corporate value from small investors rather than
monitor managers. In the model, managers may bribe dominant shareholders not to
discipline them when they are performing poorly by sharing private information with
those shareholders. If the firm’s stock is sufficiently liquid, trading on such information
is profitable, and large shareholders may prefer to trade on this information instead of
monitoring managers (i.e., foregone trading profits represent the opportunity cost of
monitoring). In summary, Maug’s model suggests that banning insider trading may align
the interests of controlling and small shareholders, while permitting insider trading may
increase the likelihood that dominant shareholders will collude with shirking managers,
in exchange for trading profits at the expense of minority shareholders and corporate
performance.
The impact of insider trading on managers’ and controlling shareholders’
incentives and thus on the agency conflict is ultimately an empirical question, which has
yet to be satisfactorily answered. (Easterbrook 1985). This article attempts to answer
this question by investigating the relationship between corporate valuation and insider
trading laws across countries. 17 It builds upon La Porta et al.’s (2002) empirical study of
the relationship between investor protection and corporate valuation.

16

Along similar lines, La Porta et al. (1999) suggests that the primary agency problem in firms with
controlling shareholders “is not the failure of the Berle and Means (1932) professional managers to serve
minority shareholders, but rather the...expropriation of such minorities…by controlling shareholders.” (La
Porta et al. (1999), pp. 3-4). The implication is that the law ought to be concerned not only with preventing
managerial value diversion but also with containing expropriation by large shareholders. (see, e.g., La
Porta et al. 1998; La Porta, et al. 1999; and Bukart and Panunzi 2006).
17
The article by Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) is distinguishable in that they investigate the
relationship between the enactment and enforcement of insider trading laws and the aggregate cost of
capital across countries. Moreover, while Masson and Madhavan (1991) examine the relationship between
executives’ insider trading and the marginal value of the firm, their study differs from the present study in
several important respects: it is based solely on U.S. data, it considers only legal (not illegal) insider

9
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E.

Hypotheses

This article tests two hypotheses regarding the effect of insider trading regulation
on the agency conflict in firms that have a controlling shareholder. 18

Hypothesis 1 (H1). More stringent insider trading laws increase firm value by reducing
the controlling shareholder’s incentive to divert corporate value through insider
trading. 19

The first hypothesis (H1) addresses the first order effect of insider trading laws on
corporate value. As noted above, the literature contains conflicting accounts of the effect
of insider trading on the agency conflict (and hence corporate value). Bhide (1993) and
Demsetz (1986) argue that insider trading is beneficial because it compensates
controlling shareholders for the valuable monitoring role that they play. The implication
is that prohibiting insider trading will reduce controlling shareholders’ incentives to
monitor managers, to the detriment of corporate value. (Bhide 1993). Maug (2002)
counters with the claim that prohibiting insider trading will increase controlling

trading, and it does not address the role of insider trading law/enforcement as a potential constraint upon
executives’ incentives to trade.
18
I focus on firms with a controlling shareholder for two reasons. First, while a substantial part of
the prior literature focuses on the conflict between managers and shareholders, the conflict between
managers and controlling shareholders on the one hand and minority shareholders on the other hand is
probably the more salient conflict outside of the United States. (La Porta et al. 2002). Since I test the
hypotheses on international data, this consideration motivates my focus on firms with a controlling
shareholder. Second, testing the implications of insider trading laws in firms with dispersed share
ownership would require data on executive compensation, since insider trading profits may substitute for
other forms of compensation and insider trading may thus have a non-discernable impact on corporate
value (assuming there are no incentive effects). (Roulstone 2003; Noe 1997). Yet, these data are not
readily available for foreign corporations. In contrast, data on the existence of controlling shareholders and
their ownership and control stakes are available. Controlling shareholders are subject directly or indirectly
to the insider trading prohibition in all of the countries in my sample.
19
The alternative hypothesis is that insider trading laws have no impact (or a negative impact) on
corporate value.

10
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shareholders’ incentives to monitor managers instead of colluding with them at the
expense of minority shareholders. Under Maug’s (2002) account, insider trading laws
force controlling shareholders to internalize the costs that insider trading imposes upon
minority shareholders, while reducing their benefits from insider trading. H1, which
adopts Maug’s (2002) view as the null hypothesis, puts these competing claims to the
empirical test.

Hypothesis 2 (H2). Insider trading laws and the controlling shareholder’s financial
stake in the firm are substitute means to mitigate the agency conflict. Therefore, the
more restrictive the insider trading prohibition, the lower the marginal increase in
corporate value from an increase in the controlling shareholder’s financial stake in the
firm. 20
The second hypothesis (H2) predicts a substitution effect between the insider
trading prohibition and the controlling shareholder’s financial stake in the firm. 21 For the
reasons explained above, the insider trading prohibition may mitigate the conflict of
interest between controlling and minority shareholders. The financial stake of the
controlling shareholder may also mitigate this conflict. 22 Assuming that insider trading
is costly to the firm, the controlling shareholder will bear a greater share of this cost as

20

The alternative hypothesis is that insider trading laws and the controlling shareholder’s financial
stake are complementary ways to mitigate the agency conflict.
21
This prediction is analogous to the hypothesized substitution effect between executive
compensation and managers’ profits from insider trading. (Carlton and Fischel 1983). See Easterbrook
(1985) on the potential substitutability between insider trading laws and other mechanisms to mitigate the
agency conflict between managers and shareholders. See also Bukart and Panunzi (2006), who discuss
substitution between investor protection laws and alternative agency cost control devices.
22
This is the established insight that greater cash flow ownership by corporate insiders (managers,
large shareholders, etc.) lowers their incentives to divert corporate wealth from outside investors. For
example, see Jensen and Meckling (1976); Shleifer and Vishny (1986).
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her financial stake in the firm increases. Thus, her incentive to trade will fall as her
ownership stake in the firm increases if insider trading is detrimental to the firm.
Assuming insider trading is detrimental, the substitution hypothesis (H2) predicts
that, as the controlling shareholder’s financial stake increases, the marginal valuation
effect of an increase in the stringency of the insider trading prohibition will fall.
(Equivalently, as the insider trading prohibition becomes more stringent, the marginal
valuation effect of an increase in the controlling shareholder’s financial stake will fall.)
Table 1 summarizes the article’s empirically testable hypotheses.
III. Data and Summary Statistics
In this Part, I describe the data and present summary statistics.
The Data
La Porta and his co-authors shared their firm-level data with me. They assembled
valuation and ownership information for the twenty largest firms (based on market
capitalization) in twenty-seven developed countries (based on 1993 per capita income).
La Porta et al. (2002) focuses on large firms because it is more difficult to detect the
beneficial impact of investor protection laws on corporate value for large firms. 23 Their
sample excludes firms that are foreign-affiliates as well as banks and other financial
institutions. Most of the data are for 1995 and 1996, but a few data points come from
1997 and two observations are from before 1995. (La Porta et al. 2002).
Like La Porta et al. (2002), I consider only firms that have an identifiable
controlling shareholder. I focus on this type of firm because controlling shareholders

23

As La Porta et al. (2002) point out, large firms may have several alternative means to constrain
expropriation of minority investors, “including public scrutiny, reputation-building, foreign shareholdings,
or listings on international exchanges.” (La Porta et al. 2002, p. 16). Consequently, the benefits of legal
constraints ought to be harder to detect in large firms.

12
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have superior access to inside information relative to small shareholders and therefore
have a greater opportunity to engage in insider trading by colluding with managers at the
expense of small shareholders. At the same time, controlling shareholders are better able
to monitor managers in the interest of small shareholders and presumably will do so if
they are adequately compensated. These competing tendencies highlight the struggle
between the net effect of insider trading on controlling shareholders’ incentive to monitor
managers and expropriate value from minority shareholders. (compare Bhide (1993) and
Demsetz (1986) with Maug (2002)). I adopt La Porta et al.’s (2002) definition of control
where a shareholder is deemed to have control over the firm if the shareholder owns ten
percent or more of the firm’s voting shares.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this study is “Tobin’s Q,” a measure of corporate
valuation and proxy for agency costs commonly used in corporate finance literature.
Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value of the firm to the replacement cost of its
assets. 24 A larger Tobin’s Q suggests that the market values the firm more highly than
firms with a lower Tobin’s Q. Higher Tobin’s Q may result from the market’s optimism
about the firm’s future growth prospects because of good management, lower agency
costs, favorable market conditions, or a high level of goodwill. I use La Porta et al.’s
(2002) measure of Tobin’s Q, which they define as “the book value of assets minus the
book value of equity minus deferred taxes plus the market value of common stock” (i.e.,
the market value of assets) divided “by the book value of assets.” (La Porta et al. 2002,
24

Tobin’s Q is not a perfect measure of firm valuation, since the numerator partly reflects the market
value of intangible assets, but the denominator does not include the firm’s investments in intangible assets.
See Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) for a more thorough discussion of the pros and cons of Tobin’s Q
relative to alternative valuation measures. Nevertheless, it is one of the most commonly used measures of
corporate value in the literature.
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p. 1156). Controlling for other factors that may affect corporate valuation, if insider
trading laws mitigate the agency conflict and thereby reduce agency costs, firms in
countries with more stringent insider trading laws ought to have higher Tobin’s Qs.
Independent Variables
Both countries’ insider trading laws and controlling shareholders’ financial stakes
in firms may influence these shareholders’ choice between monitoring and colluding with
managers. Thus, I include measures of these characteristics as independent variables in
the regressions presented in Part IV.
Hypothesis 1 (H1) predicts that firms in countries with more stringent insider
trading laws have higher market valuations because such laws reduce controlling
shareholders’ incentive to divert corporate value through insider trading. As a measure of
the stringency of insider trading laws, I use Beny’s (2005) insider trading law index
(ITL). ITL is an index of five substantive elements of each country’s insider trading law:
(1) whether the law prohibits insiders from tipping outsiders; (2) whether the law
prohibits trading by tippees 25 ; (3) whether the law provides a private right of action to
investors who traded opposite the insider(s) who traded in violation of the country’s
insider trading law; (4) whether the potential damages are a multiple of the insider’s
trading profits; and (5) whether violation of the law is a criminal offense.26 Each element
is assigned the value of zero or one, and the total ITL index is the sum of the individual
elements. Thus, ITL equals five in countries with the most prohibitive insider trading
laws (e.g., the United States), and ITL equals zero in countries with the least prohibitive

25

Tippees are outsiders who receive material non-public information from corporate insiders who
are prohibited from trading on the basis of such information themselves.
26
In Beny (2007a) I explain in more detail the rationale for including each element of the law in the
insider trading law index.
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insider trading laws (e.g., Mexico and Norway). 27 The insider trading laws of all the
countries in the sample prohibit insider trading by controlling shareholders, either directly
or indirectly. Thus, at least in theory, controlling shareholders who engage in illegal
insider trading in these countries are subject to the sanctions coded in the Beny (2005)
index.
The insider trading laws on the books are one matter. Whether they are enforced
and to what degree is another matter altogether because the laws’ deterrent effect is a
function of the probability that they will be enforced. (see, e.g., Zimring and Hawkins,
1973). Unfortunately, reliable international data on the frequency and degree of insider
trading enforcement is not available. Thus, for the time being, I must rely on a fairly
rudimentary enforcement measure. That measure is a dummy variable that is equal to
one if a country’s insider trading law was enforced at least once prior to 1994, and zero
otherwise. 28 I call this measure Enforced and I include it as an independent variable in
the regressions. I also include the interaction between (i.e., the product of) ITL and
Enforced in the regressions.
The underlying data from which I construct the variable Enforced are from
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002), who report the year in which over one hundred countries
enforced their insider trading laws for the first time. This measure of enforcement is
admittedly problematic. That a country has enforced the law at least once by 1994 does
not provide much insight on the frequency and degree of enforcement. Nevertheless, it
27

All of the countries in the sample had insider trading laws on the books as of 1994. In fact, most
stock markets have insider trading laws, but the rate and timing of enforcement varies considerably across
markets. See Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) and Beny (2007b).
28
I choose 1994 as the cut-off date because the dependent variables come from around the period
1995-1996 and because the insider trading law indices are based on the sample countries’ insider trading
rules as they existed around the same period. Both the content and the enforcement of these laws may have
changed in many of these countries since 1994. See Herrington (2004) for more recent measures of insider
trading rules and enforcement across countries.
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may be a proxy (even if a noisy one) for active enforcement based on the logic that
having been enforced once, a law is more likely to be enforced again. It may also
distinguish sham regimes from non-sham or partially-sham regimes. H1 predicts that the
regression coefficients on both Enforced and the product of ITL and Enforced will be
positive.
Hypothesis 2 (H2) predicts a substitution effect between the insider trading
prohibition and the controlling shareholder’s financial stake in the firm. That is, H2
predicts that as the controlling shareholder’s financial stake increases, the marginal
positive effect (on corporate value) of an increase in the stringency of the insider trading
prohibition will fall. As a measure of the controlling shareholder’s financial stake, I use
La Porta et al.’s (2002) measure of the proportion of the firm’s cash flow rights directly
and indirectly owned by the controlling shareholder. I control for this measure directly in
the regressions because, as noted above, when the controlling shareholder has a greater
financial stake in the firm, she will bear a greater proportion of any losses caused by the
agency conflict that may be exacerbated by insider trading. In addition, to test H2, I
include the interaction between (i.e., the product of) the insider trading law index, ITL,
and the controlling shareholder’s financial stake as a separate independent variable in the
regressions. H2 predicts that the regression coefficient on this interaction term will be
negative.
Control Variables
I include several additional control variables in the regressions below. Prior
research shows that corporate valuation is positively related to the firm’s investment
opportunities. Following La Porta et al. (2002), I use sales growth as a proxy for the
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firm’s investment opportunities. La Porta et al. define sales growth as the average annual
rate of growth of the firm’s sales for the previous three-year period (or fewer years, if
three years’ of sales data are unavailable).
Prior research also demonstrates that common law legal origin is positively
related to the level of investor protection in a country and to the country’s degree of
financial development and corporate valuation. (see, e.g., La Porta et al. 1997, 1998,
2002). 29 Conversely, civil law legal origin is negatively related to investor protection,
financial development, and corporate valuation. (Id.). Therefore, I include a dummy
variable that equals one if the firm’s country is a common law country and zero if the
firm’s country is a civil law country. I also control for industry because corporate
valuation is likely to vary systematically by industry, as discussed below.
The data are described in Table 2.
Summary Statistics
Table 3 presents the mean and median values of several key variables for the full
sample and for each individual country in the sample. I divide the sample into two
regimes: Low ITL and High ITL. The cutoff between High ITL and Low ITL is the
median value of the interaction term, ITL*Enforced, which equals two. I classify
countries with a value of ITL*Enforced that is greater than the median of two as High
ITL regimes, while I classify those with a value of ITL*Enforced that is less than or equal
to the median of two as Low ITL regimes. Consistent with H1, the High ITL countries
have higher mean and median values of Tobin’s Q than the Low ITL countries, The t-test
statistic reveals that the difference in mean Tobin’s Q between the High ITL and the Low

29

Roe (2006) argues, however, that politics explains different levels of financial development across
countries better than legal origin.
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ITL countries is statistically significant at the 1% level. However, the difference in
median Tobin’s Q between the High ITL and the Low ITL countries is not statistically
significant.
Consistent with H2, Table 3 also shows that the controlling shareholder tends to
own a larger fraction of the firm’s cash flows in the Low ITL countries than in the High
ITL countries.. The differences in both mean and median cash flow ownership between
the two regimes are statistically significant at the 1% level. Finally, mean and median
sales growth are higher in the High ITL countries than in the Low ITL countries, and the
difference is statistically significant at the 10% and 1% levels, respectively. This
suggests that the firms in the High ITL countries tend to have greater investment
opportunities than the firms in the Low ITL countries.
Table 4 presents the means by legal origin. The common law countries in the
sample have a greater average value of ITL than the civil law countries in the sample.
This difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Nearly half of the common law
countries have enforced their insider trading laws at least once. In comparison, only 25%
of the civil law countries have enforced their insider trading laws at least once. This
difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Average Tobin’s Q is higher for the
firms in civil law countries than for the firms in common law countries, and the
difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Finally, mean sales growth, a proxy
for investment opportunities, is not significantly different between the common law and
civil law firms.
Table 5 presents simple correlations highlighting the relationship between Tobin’s
Q and several key variables. Tobin’s Q is positively correlated with ITL (correlation
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coefficient of 0.09 and 5% statistical significance) and Enforced (correlation coefficient
of 0.11 and 1% statistical significance). Although they are not large, these correlations
are consistent with H1, which predicts a positive relationship between insider trading law
and corporate valuation (see Table 1). Tobin’s Q is also positively correlated with sales
growth (correlation coefficient of 0.23 and 1% statistical significance). While the
magnitudes of the foregoing correlation coefficients are not large, they are consistent
with ex ante expectations. Controlling for other factors that may affect corporate
valuation, multivariable regression analysis will reveal whether the positive association
between Tobin’s Q and insider trading laws withstands deeper scrutiny.
IV.

Methodology and Regression Results
A.

Methodology

To test Hypotheses 1 and 2 (H1 and H2), I estimate variations on the following
basic regression:
Tobin’s Q = B0 + B1SalesGrowth + B2ITL + B3Ownership + B4ITL*Ownership + e
where Tobin’s Q (the dependent variable) is a measure of corporate valuation,
SalesGrowth is the average annual rate of sales growth for to the previous three years,
ITL is the insider trading law index, Ownership is the controlling shareholder’s financial
stake (cash flow rights) in the firm, and ITL*Ownership is the product of the two
previous variables. H1 predicts that B2 will be positive, while H2 predicts that B4 will be
B

B

negative. I also report alternative specifications to the basic regression, as explained
below. I consider a coefficient to be statistically significant if it is at least significant at
the 10% level.
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I use random effects maximum likelihood estimation because the errors are not
independent within countries and this methodology takes both within and between
country variation into account, adjusting the standard errors to reflect the correlation
among observations from the same country. In all of the regressions reported below, the
dependent variable is the log of 1 plus Tobin’s Q. I take the log of Tobin’s Q because its
distribution is skewed to the right, and a log transformation of Tobin’s Q yields a more
normal distribution. Each firm’s Tobin’s Q is adjusted by industry, i.e., for each firm
Tobin’s Q equals its Tobin’s Q minus the world-wide median Tobin’s Q for all of the
firms in the same industry. The rationale for this adjustment is to eliminate industryspecific components of valuation.
B.

Results

Table 6 presents the results of random effects regressions. The regressions in
Panel A use the insider trading law index, ITL, while the regressions in Panel B use the
interaction term, ITL*Enforced. In all of the regressions in both panels, the coefficient on
sales growth is positive and significant. In column (1) of Panel A, the coefficient on ITL
is positive, consistent with H1 (see Table 1); however, it is statistically insignificant. In
column (2) of Panel A, the coefficient on cash flow ownership of the controlling
shareholder is positive and significant at the 10% level. In column (3) of Panel A, the
coefficient on the interaction, ITL*Enforced and cash flow ownership is positive and
significant at the 10% level, suggesting that cash flow ownership and insider trading laws
are complementary. This result is inconsistent with H2 (the “Substitution” Hypothesis),
which predicts a negative coefficient on the interaction between ITL and cash flow
ownership (see Table 1). Finally, none of the coefficients on the independent variables,
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except sales growth, are statistically significant when I include them jointly in a single
regression in column (4) of Panel A. 30 The regressions in Panel B, which replaces ITL
with ITL*Enforced but are otherwise identical to the regressions in Panel A, yield similar
results to those in Panel A.
It may be inappropriate to lump all of the firms together, as I do in Table 6,
without allowing for heterogeneity – that is, systematic differences in the effect of insider
trading laws on agency costs – among the sample firms. Prior research has shown that
financial markets and corporate governance structures differ significantly between
common law and civil law countries (see, e.g., La Porta et al. 1997, 1998). Consistent
with this research, I find significant differences by legal origin among the firms and
countries in my sample. For instance, the common law firms tend to have significantly
more liquid shares than the civil law firms. In addition, the ownership and control stakes
of controlling shareholders tend to be more closely aligned in the common law firms than
in the civil law firms. Moreover, controlling shareholders are more likely to be
corporations (as opposed to families, the state or financial institutions) in the common
law firms relative to the civil law firms. Finally, the common law countries have
significantly greater investor protections (as measured by La Porta et al.’s (1998) original
anti-director rights index), a significantly greater frequency of insider trading law
enforcement (as measured by the variable Enforced), significantly more liquid stock
markets, and a significantly greater frequency of corporate acquisitions relative to the
civil law countries.
Therefore, I allow for heterogeneity between the common law and civil law firms
by interacting the variables of interest with the dummy variable for common law origin in
30

This may result from multicollinearity among these variables.
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a new set of regressions. 31 I also address multicollinearity between ITL and the
interaction terms by centering ITL on its sample mean. The dependent variable is still the
log of 1 plus Tobin’s Q, where, as explained above, Tobin’s Q is adjusted by industry.
The independent variables are sales growth, cash flow ownership, centered-ITL, and
several interaction terms between common law origin and various other variables that I
explain as I present the results. The results are reported in Table 7.
In column (1) of Table 7, the coefficient on centered-ITL is negative but
insignificant, while the coefficient on the interaction between centered-ITL and common
law is positive and significant at the 1% level. The regression in column (2) is the same
as the regression in column (1), except that in column (2) I control for common law
origin. This has two effects: Ffirst, the coefficient on centered-ITL becomes significant
at the 10% level; and second, the net effect of cash flow ownership becomes negative for
the common law firms.
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 7, I replace centered-ITL with the interaction
between centered-ITL and Enforced. The results in columns (3) and (4) are consistent
with those in columns (1) and (2). The coefficients on the centered-ITL*Enforced are
negative (albeit insignificant) in columns (3) and (4), while the coefficients on the
interaction between centered-ITL*Enforced and common law origin are positive and
significant at the respective 1% and 5% levels for the firms in common law countries. 32
The regressions in Table 7 also suggest that although cash flow ownership is generally
31

While country fixed effects estimation would be a preferable approach, I am unable to run fixed
effects regressions because the insider trading law variables already serve as country dummy variables.
Also, I do not split the sample into common law and civil law firms because that would reduce the variation
among the independent variables. Below, I discuss the effect of controlling explicitly for several factors
that one may expect to differ systematically between the common and civil law countries and firms.
32
The regression in column (4) differs from the regression in column (3) only in that it controls for
common law origin.
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associated with greater corporate valuation, (i.e., cash flow ownership by the controlling
shareholder has an incentive effect), this effect is stronger for the firms in civil law
countries than for the firms in common law countries. 33 Inconsistent with H2, the
coefficients on the interaction terms between cash flow ownership and the insider trading
measures are positive (see rows (8) – (11)), suggesting that cash flow ownership and
insider trading laws are complements rather than substitutes. However, these coefficients
are insignificant.
In summary, the results in Table 7 suggest that H1 accurately describes the firms
in common law countries but that H1 does not accurately describe the firms in civil law
countries. Specifically, insider trading laws are associated positively with corporate
valuation for the firms in common law countries (see rows (4) and (5) of Table 7). In
contrast, for the firms in civil law countries, insider trading laws are (at best) irrelevant to
corporate valuation (see row (3) of Table 7) and (at worst) negatively associated with
corporate valuation (see row (2) of Table 7). While cash flow ownership of the
controlling shareholder is generally positively associated with corporate valuation for the
firms in civil law countries, the results on cash flow ownership are mixed for the firms in
common law countries. Finally, inconsistent with H2, there does not appear to be a
substitution effect between insider trading law and the controlling shareholder’s equity
stake in the firm. To the contrary, the coefficients in rows (8) through (11) in Table 7
suggest that, if anything, there is a complementary relationship between cash flow
ownership and insider trading law. However, this relationship is statistically
insignificant.

33

This result is consistent with Durnev and Kim (2005), who find that the incentive effect of cash
flow ownership is more important when investor protection is weaker.
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V.

Robustness Checks
In this section, I address several potential robustness concerns. First, I investigate

whether the results robust to controlling for a firm’s industry. The regressions in Tables
7 and 8 do not control for industry. However, corporate valuation may vary
systematically by industry. (see, e.g., Demsetz and Lehn 1985). Industry variation in
corporate valuation may result in some industries being inherently more prone than others
to private benefits extraction. (i.e., “amenity potential”, according to Demsetz and Lehn
1985). Another reason for industry variation in valuation may stem from different
industries being at different stages of growth. (La Porta et al. 2002). Thus, a common
approach in the literature is to control for industry in corporate valuation regressions.
(see, e.g., Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Morck et al. 1988; and Claessens, et al. 2002). I add
industry dummies to the regressions and substitute La Porta et al.’s (2002) industry
adjusted sales growth variable for the raw sales growth measure. La Porta et al. (2002)
define industry adjusted sales growth as the difference between the firm’s sales growth
and the world median sales growth among firms in the same industry. Using industry
adjusted sales growth instead of raw sales growth controls for the possibility “that
different industries may be at different stages of maturity and growth that determine their
valuations.” (La Porta et al. 2002, p. 1159).
Second, I address the potential endogeneity of corporate ownership. Thus far, I
have assumed that the controlling shareholder’s ownership stake is exogenous, i.e.,
determined independently of the country’s insider trading laws. This assumption may be
incorrect. La Porta et al. (1998) show that ownership tends to be more concentrated in
countries with weak investor protections than in countries with strong investor
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protections. Similarly, in other work I show that ownership concentration is greater in
countries with lax insider trading laws than in countries with stringent insider trading
laws, controlling for legal origin, anti-director rights, and other factors relevant to
ownership concentration (Beny 2005). If the controlling shareholder’s ownership stake is
endogenous to the country’s legal rules governing financial markets, the results in Table
7 may be biased. I address this issue in the same manner as La Porta et al. (2002). They
address the issue by considering only “within-country variation in cash-flow ownership
(fixed effects estimation), which is arguably more exogenous to the legal regime,” by
replacing the raw measure of the controlling shareholder’s cash flow ownership with the
difference between the controlling shareholder’s cash flow ownership at the firm level
and the country average of the same variable. (La Porta et al. 2002, p. 1166).
The results of the foregoing adjustments are presented in Table 8. A comparison
of Tables 7 and 8 reveals that the results are essentially the same after I make these
adjustments. The major differences between Tables 7 and 8 are that: (1) most of the
statistically significant coefficients in Table 7 become even more significant in Table 8;
(2) the coefficient on centered-ITL*Common Law becomes slightly smaller (compare row
(4) in Table 7 with the same row in Table 8); (3) the coefficients on centeredITL*Enforced*Common Law decrease in magnitude (compare row (5) of Table 7 with the
same row in Table 8); and (4) the positive coefficient on cash flow ownership (row (6) in
Tables 7 and 8) becomes significant at the 5% level in every regression in Table 8, in
contrast to Table 7, where the coefficient on cash flow ownership (row (6)) is
insignificant in column (1) and significant at only the 10% level in column (2).
Otherwise, the results in Tables 7 and 8 are substantively the same.
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Another concern is whether the results are influenced by omitted variables. As
discussed above, heterogeneity in the relationship between insider trading laws and
corporate valuation among the sample firms may result from systematic differences
between common law and civil law countries in factors relevant to the relationship
between insider trading laws and corporate valuation. These factors include various
financial, market, regulatory and institutional characteristics. In Table 7, I addressed this
issue by interacting the insider trading law and ownership variables with common law
origin. However, if the data are available, it is preferable to control directly for the
relevant factors that may systematically differ between common law and civil law
countries.
I address omitted variables by explicitly controlling for several potentially
relevant financial, market, regulatory and institutional characteristics of the sample
countries and firms, including: (1) enforcement environment and judicial efficiency; (2)
liquidity of the firm’s shares and the stock market; (3) corporate disclosure; (4) market
participants’ perception of the severity of insider trading in the stock market; (5) the
firm’s control structure and the strength of the country’s corporate law; (6) the market for
corporate control; and (7) the controlling shareholder’s identity. I explain the rationale
and effect of controlling for each of these factors in turn. 34
First, the results may derive from the general quality of the legal system rather
than insider trading law if countries with more stringent insider trading laws also have
more stringent enforcement, stronger rule of law, or more efficient judiciaries than
countries with less stringent insider trading laws. 35 I alternately control for each of these

34
35

I do not present the results in the interest of brevity.
Beny’s (2005) evidence suggests that this is the case.
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country characteristics using the following variables: the dummy variable Enforced,
which is a dummy variable equal to one if the country enforced its insider trading law for
the first time by 1994 and zero otherwise; a measure of the rule of law from La Porta et
al. (1998); and an index of judicial efficiency from La Porta et al. (1998). Table 2
describes these variables in greater detail. The results are robust to controlling for each
of these variables.
Second, the different relationship between insider trading laws and valuation
between the common law and civil law firms may result from systematic differences in
share liquidity between the two legal systems. Specifically, if common law firms tend to
have more liquid shares than civil law firms, and if there is a positive relationship
between stock market liquidity and insider trading laws, 36 the positive relationship
observed between valuation and insider trading laws among the common law firms may
stem from the fact that these firms have more liquid shares than civil law firms 37 since
investors are willing to pay a liquidity premium. (Amiuhud and Mendelson 1986; La
Porta et al. 2002).
I investigate the effect of liquidity by controlling for both stock market liquidity
and individual firm liquidity using data from the World Bank and Datastream. Both
liquidity measures are described in detail in Table 2. These data confirm that both stock
36

Georgakopoulos (1993) argues that it is only when the stock market becomes sufficiently liquid
that there is adequate social demand for insider trading regulation. Beny’s (2007b) finding that countries
with more liquid stock markets are more likely to pass and enforce insider trading laws than countries with
less liquid stock markets is consistent with this claim. The explanation could be that insider trading is more
profitable and thus more likely to occur the more liquid is the stock market, other things equal (Maug
2002). But see Bhide (1993), who argues that causality runs from insider trading laws to liquidity, rather
than the reverse. (Bhide 1993). In any event, stock markets do tend to be more liquid in countries with
more stringent insider trading laws and enforcement. (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002; Beny (2005, 2007a).
37
Civil law firms’ shares may be relatively illiquid because ownership is more concentrated among
these firms. According to Bhide (1993), “when stockholding is fully diffuse, the firm’s stock is likely to be
the most liquid.” (Bhide 1993, pp. 45-46). Consistent with this claim, Eleswarapu and Krishnamurti (1999)
find that ownership concentration and liquidity are inversely related among Indian firms.
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markets and individual firm stocks are more liquid in the common law sample
countries. 38 As expected, the coefficients on both stock market liquidity and firm
liquidity are positive and significant in the Tobin’s Q regressions. However, the results
are robust to controlling for both liquidity measures. 39
Third, the regressions in Table 7 do not control for the quality of corporate
disclosure. Academics and lawmakers have long noted the close relationship between
disclosure rules and insider trading laws. More punctual and higher quality disclosure
ought to reduce insiders’ opportunity to trade profitably relative to the rest of the market.
(Baiman and Verrecchia 1996; Fried 1997; Maug 2002; Shin 1996). 40 I control for two
measures of disclosure. First, I control for the quality of accounting standards, as
reported in La Porta et al. (1998). This index ranks countries according to the quality of
their corporate disclosure practices as of 1990. Second, I control for a measure of legal
disclosure requirements, constructed by La Porta et al. (2006). This index measures how
much corporate governance-relevant information firms are legally required to include in
their offering prospectuses. I describe both disclosure variables in more detail in Table 2.
Alternately controlling for these disclosure variables has no effect on the results reported
above.

38

Ownership (of the controlling shareholder) is also more concentrated among the civil law firms
(see Table 4).
39
La Porta et al. (2002) address liquidity indirectly by investigating whether the sample firms that have
American Depository Receipts (ADRs) traded in the U.S. have higher valuations than those without ADRs.
They find a small positive effect of ADRs for the common law firms but not for the civil law firms, which
is “inconsistent with the view that liquidity drives [their finding that valuation is greater for common law
firms than for civil law firms] since, on that theory, the benefit of an ADR for valuation ought to be higher
in less liquid markets (in civil law countries).” (La Porta et al. 2002, p. 1165).
40
Indeed, an important pillar of U.S. insider trading legislation is the “disclose or abstain” rule,
which requires that insiders either disclose material nonpublic information or refrain from trading on the
basis of such information. Several other countries effectively follow the “disclose or abstain” approach.
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Fourth, the results may arise because I do not control for the public perception of
insider trading. A perception that insider trading is more prevalent in common law
countries may explain why insider trading regulation is more strongly and positively
associated with corporate valuation in such countries. To address this issue, I control for
the perception of insider trading, using a measure from the World Economic Forum’s
Global Competitiveness Report (1996), which is described in Table 2. Controlling for
the perception of insider trading does not alter the results. In fact, for the countries in my
sample, the public perception of insider trading is greater among the civil law countries
than among the common law countries. This would seem to suggest a plausible
alternative interpretation of the results; namely, that insider trading laws are perceived to
be less effective in civil law countries. That is, holding constant the public perception of
insider trading activity, the investing public may view insider trading regulations to be
less effective at controlling such activity in civil law countries than in common law
countries. However, it may also mean that there are offsetting benefits to insider trading
in civil law countries. I discuss these issues in more detail below.
Fifth, the results may result from systematic differences in controlling
shareholders’ incentives and ability to extract private benefits. Such differences may
result from systematic differences in corporate control structures, corporate laws, or some
combination thereof, between civil law and common law countries. Consider Maug’s
(2002) theoretical framework in which large shareholders face a tradeoff between
monitoring and engaging in insider trading. 41 Other things equal, the greater the

41

Managers may bribe large shareholders not to monitor by giving them private information on
which they can profitably trade. (Maug 2002). If large shareholders’ marginal payoffs from trading are
greater than their marginal payoffs from monitoring, at the margin they will choose trading over
monitoring. (Maug 2002).
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controlling shareholder’s incentives and ability to extract private benefits, the more likely
she is to trade rather than to monitor at the margin. 42 Two characteristics that have a
strong influence on the controlling shareholder’s incentives and ability to extract private
benefits are the firm’s control structure and the country’s corporate laws. 43 I therefore
control for both of these characteristics.
I use one firm-specific and one country-specific proxy for the controlling
shareholder’s incentives and ability to extract private benefits. As a proxy for the
controlling shareholder’s incentives to extract private benefits I use the “control wedge”,
which is the divergence between the controlling shareholder’s control and ownership
stakes from La Porta et al. (2002). 44 The larger the control wedge, the greater the
deviation from one-share-one-vote, and thus the greater the controlling shareholder’s
incentives and ability to extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders.
(Grossman and Hart 1988; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny 1988; Harris and Raviv 1988;
Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Bebchuk, Kraakman, and Triantis 2000; and La Porta et al.
2002). Consistent with this, empirical research has shown that there is a tradeoff between
ownership and control, with corporate valuation increasing in the controlling
shareholder’s cash flow ownership (the incentive effect) and decreasing in the controlling
shareholder’s voting control (the entrenchment effect). (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny
42

However, for this logic to explain the results in Tables 7 and 8, it ought to be the case that
controlling shareholders have greater incentives to expropriate private benefits in the common law
countries. But that does not describe the empirical pattern revealed in the law and finance literature.
43
La Porta et al. (2002) find that common law origin and stronger anti-director rights are associated
with higher corporate valuation for their same sample of firms. My results may be driven by anti-director
rules rather than by insider trading laws, if countries that have stricter anti-self-dealing corporate laws also
tend to have more stringent insider trading laws. Indeed, they do for this sample. The correlation
coefficients are 0.36 (significance 1%) between the original anti-director rights index (La Porta et al. 1998)
and ITL; 0.27 (significance 1%) between the revised anti-director rights index (Djankov et al. (2006)) and
ITL; and 0.44 (significance 1%) between the anti-self-dealing (Djankov et al. (2006)) index.
44
I use two measures of the control wedge, the arithmetic difference and the ratio between the
controlling owner’s control and ownership stakes. The results are the same with either measure.
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1988; Claessens et al. 2002; Morck, Stangeland, and Yeung 2000; and Durnev and Kim
2005).
As a proxy for the ability to extract private benefits, I use three measures of the
stringency of a country’s corporate laws: La Porta et al.’s (1998) original anti-director
rights index; (2) Djankov et al.’s (2006) revised anti-director rights index; and (3)
Djankov et al.’s (2006) anti-self-dealing index. Alternately controlling for the control
wedge and each investor protection variable does not alter the results. In fact, the insider
trading law variables overcome La Porta et al.’s (1998) original anti-director rights index
and Djankov et al.’s (2006) revised anti-director rights and anti-self-dealing indices. The
coefficients on the insider trading law variables remain positive and significant for the
common law sample firms, while the coefficients on the anti-director and anti-selfdealing variables are insignificant.
Sixth, it may be inappropriate to ignore the market for corporate control, as I do in
Table 7. Corporate takeovers provide a fertile (and common) context for insider
trading. 45 The more competitive the market for corporate control, the greater the
potential profits from trading on the basis of private information about an impending
takeover, since greater competition increases takeover premia. (Burkart et al. 1998). The
market for corporate control is less competitive when control is more closely held, as it
tends to be among firms in civil law countries. (see, e.g., Dyck and Zingales 2004; and
Nenova 2003). In addition, hold-out problems are less severe when ownership is more
45

Two recent studies that document insider trading around corporate takeovers are Ackerman and
Maug (2006) and Bris (2005). Bris (2005) studies the relationship between the profitability of insider
trading around corporate takeovers and insider trading law and enforcement and finds that insider trading is
less profitable when the law is more stringent. Ackerman and Maug (2006) study the relationship between
insider trading laws and enforcement and the predictability of takeover announcement returns and find that
there is less private information trading in stock markets governed by more stringent insider trading laws.
Both Bris (2005) and Ackerman and Maug (2006) use Beny’s (2005) index of insider trading law.
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concentrated, as it tends to be in firms in civil law countries, driving down the price of
corporate acquisitions. For these reasons, corporate takeovers may present less lucrative
trading opportunities in civil law countries, other things equal. In short, if the market for
corporate control is less competitive in civil law countries than in common law countries,
this may partly explain the apparent irrelevance of insider trading laws to corporate
valuation in the sample civil law firms. 46
Therefore, I control for three measures of the market for corporate control. First,
I control for the average percent of acquisitions that were successful between January 1,
1990 and December 31, 1999 from Bris (2005). Second, I control for the ratio of the
average per capita market value of acquisitions in constant U.S. dollars between January
1, 1990 and December 31, 1999 from Bris (2005) to GDP in 1995 U.S. dollars. Finally, I
control for the average percent of acquisitions that were hostile between January 1, 1990
and December 31, 1999 from Bris (2005). In addition to the preceding measures of the
market for corporate control, I also use the mean and median values of the block
premium as a percentage of firm equity value from Dyck and Zingales (2004). Dyck and
Zingales (2004) use the block premium to infer the private benefits of control across
countries. The block premium may also be a proxy for the degree of competition in the
market for corporate control, a higher (lower) block premium suggesting less (more)
competition in the market for corporate control. Bris’ (2005) corporate control and Dyck
and Zingales’ (2004) block premia data are described in greater detail in Table 2.

46

Bris’ (2005) data suggest that the likelihood of a corporate takeover is greater in common law
countries, although the relative market value of a corporate takeover seems to be larger in civil law
countries. It is unclear which way this information cuts.
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Alternately controlling for these measures of the market for corporate control and the
block premium does not alter the results. 47
Seventh, the identity of the controlling shareholder may be relevant insofar as
different controlling shareholders may have different incentives to extract private benefits
of control. For example, a controlling shareholder that is a family may have stronger
incentives to engage in insider trading than a controlling shareholder that is a
corporation. 48 Perhaps civil law and common law countries have a differential
prevalence of types of controlling shareholders. Thus, I control for the controlling
shareholder’s identity using La Porta et al.’s (2002) data (see Table 2). This does not
change the results.
The results are also robust to controlling for GDP per capita. In fact, the civil law
countries of my sample have slightly higher average GDP per capita than the common
law countries, although the difference is statistically insignificant. Finally, I check
whether any country drives the results by sequentially dropping each country from the
regressions in Table 7. No single country drives the results.
VI.

Conclusion
This article yields two main findings. First, for the sample firms in common law

countries, insider trading laws and enforcement are positively associated with higher
corporate valuation. This evidence supports the claim that insider trading laws and their
enforcement may help to mitigate agency costs. In contrast, the relationship between
47

None of the coefficients on Bris’ (2005) acquisition measures is significant. However, the
coefficients on Dyck and Zingales’ (2004) block premia measures – mean block premium and median
block premium – are negative and significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
48
Hung and Trezevant (2004) find that insiders of Southeast Asian firms that are controlled by the
wealthiest families seem to be especially aggressive in trading on inside information. Their data are for
firms in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. My sample does not include firms from any of
these countries.
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valuation and insider trading law is negative (but generally insignificant) for the firms in
civil law countries. Second, the results do not support the notion that cash flow
ownership and insider trading laws are substitute means to control agency costs. If
anything, the results suggest that insider trading laws and equity ownership are
complementary ways to mitigate agency costs, although this finding is generally
statistically insignificant.
The result that insider trading laws are positively associated with corporate
valuation in the common law but not in the civil law countries, even though I control for
many relevant characteristics that may systematically differ between common and civil
law countries, is puzzling. There are at least two possible explanations for this result.
The first potential explanation is an economic rationale. Demsetz (1986) and Bhide
(1993) suggest that insider trading laws may have a perverse effect on corporate value by
reducing large shareholders’ incentives to engage in corporate monitoring because these
laws reduce insider trading profits, which compensate for such monitoring. Perhaps the
results can be seen in this light; that is, insider trading laws may discourage large
shareholders from monitoring in civil law countries but not in common law countries.
The negative relationship between insider trading laws and corporate valuation among
the civil law firms is generally statistically insignificant, however, which is inconsistent
with Demsetz' (1986) and Bhide's (1993) hypothesis. Instead, the results suggest that
insider trading laws may have a beneficial impact on monitoring at best and no effect at
worst.
The second potential explanation for the difference between common law and
civil law firms is a legal/institutional rationale. More specifically, insider trading laws
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may be relatively ineffective in civil law countries. Indeed, recent research suggests that
insider trading laws are less effective in countries where investor protections are
relatively weaker, as in civil law countries. Durnev and Nain (2005) argue that, where
investor protection is sufficiently weak and controlling shareholders are prohibited from
trading, these shareholders may compensate for lost trading profits by engaging in
various covert forms of expropriation. In addition, Durnev and Nain (2005) find that if
investor protection is sufficiently weak, “private information trading may remain
unchanged and even increase in the presence of insider trading restrictions.” (Durnev and
Nain 2005, p. 22). 49 Similarly, Grishchenko et. al. (2002) find that “stocks…that provide
better investor protection [and information disclosure] exhibit less private information
trading.” In contrast, Durnev and Nain (2005) find that insider trading laws
unambiguously reduce private information trading “in countries where shareholder rights
are well protected.” (Durnev and Nain 2005, p. 22). 50 Furthermore, Bhattacharya and
Daouk (2005) suggest that the cost of equity may actually increase when a country
merely enacts, but does not enforce, insider trading legislation.
The problem with the legal/institutional explanation is that the common law-civil
law dichotomy that I find is robust to controlling for various legal and institutional
differences among the countries in my sample. Nevertheless, the robustness of the
dichotomy may be due to the fact that the existing legal and institutional measures are not
good variables. If that is the case, comparative law and finance scholars ought to
49

According to Durnev and Nain (2005), “[t]he opaque informational environment that often
accompanies covert activities of controlling shareholders can, in turn, increase the information acquisition
activity of market professionals who trade at the expense of uninformed investors.” (Durnev and Nain
2005, p. 25).
50
Similarly, Ackerman and Maug's (2005) evidence suggests that insider trading laws have a greater
impact “in countries with more effective” judicial systems. But there is no reason to expect judiciaries to
be more efficient in common law countries than in civil law countries.
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construct more direct measures of the legal order and particularly the securities regulatory
and enforcement environment. (see La Porta et al. 2005 for a comparative study of
securities laws and enforcement).
Over the past two decades, there has been a concerted international effort to
encourage countries to adopt insider trading laws and to vigorously enforce such laws.
(Haddock and Macey, 1986; Gevurtz, 2002). However, the results of this article suggest
that insider trading laws are not uniformly associated with corporate valuation, a proxy
for agency costs, across countries. Indeed, the results suggest that insider trading laws
may not be an effective way to reduce agency costs in civil law countries. Moreover, the
costs of insider trading laws may well exceed their benefits in civil law countries.
Consequently, this article’s results could be read to support contractualists who oppose a
one-size-fits-all approach (i.e., a mandatory prohibition) to insider trading. (Carlton and
Fischel 1983; Haddock and Macey 1987; and Epstein 2004).
,Such a reading of the results of this article is unwarranted, however. If the
contractualists are to bear the burden of proving that mandatory insider trading laws
exacerbate agency costs, they must show that more stringent insider trading laws have a
significantly negative impact on corporate valuation. 51 The evidence in this Article does
not support such a claim. In addition, private contractual approaches to insider trading
are inherently problematic because of transaction costs, uncertainty, and externalities, 52

51

The near-universal illegality of insider trading arguably places the burden on opponents of insider trading
regulation to show that such regulation is more costly than beneficial, since they seek to change the status
quo.
52
Negative externalities are an especially important consideration in the insider trading debate,
which both this article and much of the agency literature on insider trading abstract from. Studies that
address some potential negative external effects of insider trading include Baiman and Verrechhia (1996);
Beny (2005, 2007); Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002); Bushman et al. (2005); Cox (1986); Du and Wei
(2004); Fishman and Hagerty (1992); Georgakopoulos (1993); Goshen and Parchomovsky (2001); Klock
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and may be unenforceable by private parties. (see, e.g., Easterbrook 1985; Cox 1986).
Furthermore, the apparent insignificance of insider trading laws to firms in civil law
countries may stem from relatively lax enforcement of these laws in civil law countries.
(see Jackson and Roe 2006). If that is the case, the appropriate policy response may be
greater sanctions and more stringent enforcement, not repeal of insider trading laws, in
the latter countries.
Ultimately, the results of this article suggest that the firm-level impact of insider
trading laws may depend on the local context in which such laws are applied (or not
applied, as the case may be).

(1994); Kraakman (1991); and Shin (1996). Glaeser et al. (2001) address the general issue of public versus
private regulation of stock markets.
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Table 1: Summary of Testable Hypotheses

Hypothesis

Dependent Variable

Hypothesized Relationship to
Corporate Value

H1

Insider Trading Law

Positive

H2

Cash Flow
Ownership of the
Controlling
Shareholder

Positive

H3

Insider Trading
Law*Cash Flow
Ownership of the
Controlling
Shareholder

Negative
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Table 2: Description of Variables
Description
Dependent Variables
Tobin’s Q

Tobin’s Q is defined as the market value of assets divided by their replacement value at the close of the most
recent fiscal year. The market value of assets is measured by the book value of assets minus the book value
equity minus deferred taxes plus the market value of common stock. The replacement value of assets is
approximated by the book value of assets. La Porta et al. (2002).

IndustryAdjusted
Tobin’s Q

The industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q for a given firm is defined as the difference between that firm’s Tobin’s Q
and the world median Tobin’s Q among firms in the same industry. Industry reference groups are defined at
the three-digit S.I.C. level if there are at least five WorldScope firms (not including the sample firms) in the
group and, if not, at the two-digit S.I.C. level. La Porta et al. (2002).

Cash Flow to
Price Ratio

The cash flow to price ratio is computed as the sum of earnings (net income before extraordinary items) and
depreciation. When cash flow is negative, the cash flow to price ratio is assigned a missing value. The
average cash flow to price ratio for the three most recent fiscal years is reported in US dollars. Price, in US
dollars, is the market value of common equity at the end of the most recent fiscal year. La Porta et al. (2002).

Industryadjusted Cash
Flow to Price
Ratio

The industry-adjusted cash flow to price ratio is defined as the difference between the firm’s cash flow to
price ratio and the world median cash flow to price ratio among firms in the same industry. Industry control
groups are defined in the same manner as for industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q (see above). La Porta et al. (2002).

Insider Trading Law Variables
Tipping

Tipping equals one if corporate insiders are prohibited from tipping outsiders (tippees) about material nonpublic information and/or encouraging them to trade on such information for personal gain; equals zero
otherwise. Gaillard (1992); Stamp and Welsh (1996).

Tippee

Tippee equals one if tippees, like corporate insiders, are prohibited from trading on material non-public
information that they have received from corporate insiders; equals zero otherwise. Gaillard (1992); Stamp
and Welsh (1996).

Damages

Damages equals one if potential monetary penalties for violating insider trading laws are proportional to
insiders’ trading profits; equals zero otherwise. Gaillard (1992); Stamp and Welsh (1996).

Criminal

Criminal equals one if violation of insider trading laws is a potential criminal offense; equals zero otherwise.
Gaillard (1992); Stamp and Welsh (1996).

Private

Private equals one if private parties have a private right of action against parties who have violated the
country’s insider trading laws. Gaillard (1992); Stamp and Welsh (1996).

ITL

The aggregate insider trading law index, ITL, equals the sum of (1) Tipping; (2) Tippee; (3) Damages; and
(4) Criminal; and (5) Private. Equivalently, the sum of Scope, Sanction and Private. IT Law ranges from 0
to 5, with 0 representing the most lax formal insider trading law and 5 representing the most restrictive
insider trading law. Gaillard (1992); Stamp and Welsh (1996).

Enforced

A proxy for actual enforcement, Enforced by 1994 is an indicator variable that equals one if the country’s
insider trading law has been enforced for the first time by the end of 1994. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002).

ITL*Enforced

IT Law times Enforced by 1994.
Ownership and Control Variables

Control Rights

“The fraction of the firm’s voting rights, if any, owned by its controlling shareholder. To measure control we
combine a shareholder’s direct (i.e., through shares registered in her name) and indirect (i.e., through shares
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held by entities that, in turn, she controls) voting rights in the firm. A shareholder has an x percent indirect
control over firm A if: (1) she controls directly firm B which, in turn, directly controls x percent of the votes
in firm A; or (2) she controls directly firm C which in turn controls firm B (or a sequence of firms leading to
firm B each of which has control over the next one, i.e., they form a control chain) which, in turn, directly
controls x percent of the votes in firm A. A group of n companies form a chain of control if each firm 1
through n - 1 controls the consecutive firm. A firm in our sample has a controlling shareholder if the sum of
her direct and indirect voting rights exceeds 10 percent. When two or more shareholders meet our criteria for
control, we assign control to the shareholder with the largest (direct plus indirect) voting stake.” La Porta et
al. (2002).
Cash Flow
Rights

“Ultimate cash flow right of the controlling shareholder in the sample firm. CF Rights are computed as the
product of all the equity stakes along the control chain (see description of Control Rights for an explanation
of ‘control chains’).” La Porta et al. (2002).

Countryadjusted Cash
Flow Rights

Calculated by taking the difference between the cash flow ownership of the controlling owner of a given firm
and the countrywide mean cash flow ownership of controlling shareholders. La Porta et al. (2002).

Additional Variables
Sales Growth

Sales growth is computed by the geometric average annual percentage growth in lagged net sales for up to 3
years conditional on availability of the data. Sales are reported in US dollars. La Porta et al. (2002).

IndustryAdjusted Sales
Growth

Industry adjusted sales growth is defined as the difference between the firm’s sales growth (GS) and the
world median GS among firms in the same industry. Industry control groups are defined in the same manner
as for industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q (see above). La Porta et al. (2002).

Common Law

A dummy variable that equals one if the legal origin of the country is English common law and zero
otherwise. La Porta et al. (1998); CIA (2000).

Industry

Industry reference groups are defined at the three-digit S.I.C. level if there are at least five WorldScope firms
(not including the sample firms) in the group and, if not, at the two-digit S.I.C. level. La Porta et al. (2002).

Rule of Law

The rule of law measure is an “[a]ssessment of the law and order tradition in the country. Average of the
months of April and October of the monthly index between 1982 and 1995. Scale from 0 to 10, with lower
scores for less tradition for law and order.” La Porta et al. (1998) compile this variable from the
International Country Risk Guide. A higher rule of law score signifies that the legal system is relatively
more capable of resolving disputes and enforcing contracts.

Judicial
Efficiency

The index of judicial efficiency is an “[a]ssessment of the ‘efficiency and integrity of the legal environment
as it affects business, particularly foreign firms,’” averaged from 1980-1983. La Porta et al. (1998) get this
variable from Business International Corporation.

Stock Market
Liquidity

Stock market liquidity is measured as stock market value traded divided by GDP. World Bank World
Development Indicators (1995).

Firm Liquidity

Individual firm liquidity is measured as the average monthly turnover ratio, i.e., the total value traded divided
by total market capitalization, from January 1, 1994 to December 1, 1996. Datastream.

Disclosure Index

The Disclosure index equals the arithmetic average of 6 separate indices of information that firms are legally
required to include in their prospectuses: (1) Compensation; (2) Shareholders; (3) Inside Ownership; (4)
Irregular contracts; (5) Transactions.
(1) Compensation is “[a]n index of prospectus disclosure requirements regarding the compensation of
directors and key officers. Equals one if the law or the listing rules require that the compensation of each
director and key officer be reported in the prospectus of a newly-listed firm; equals one-half if only the
aggregate compensation of directors and key officers must be reported in the prospectus of a newly-listed
firm; equals zero when there is no requirement to disclose the compensation of directors and key officers in
the prospectus for a newly-listed firm.”
(2) Shareholders is “[a]n index of disclosure requirements regarding the Issuer’s equity ownership structure.
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Equals one if the law or the listing rules require disclosing the name and ownership stake of each shareholder
who, directly or indirectly, controls ten percent or more of the Issuer’s voting securities; equals one-half if
reporting requirements for the Issuer’s 10% shareholders do not include indirect ownership or if only their
aggregate ownership needs to be disclosed; equals zero when the law does not require disclosing the name
and ownership stake of the Issuer’s 10% shareholders. No distinction is drawn between large-shareholder
reporting requirements imposed on firms and those imposed on large shareholders themselves.”
(3) Inside Ownership is “[a]n index of prospectus disclosure requirements regarding the equity ownership of
the Issuer’s shares by its directors and key officers. Equals one if the law or the listing rules require that the
ownership of the Issuer’s shares by each of its directors and key officers be disclosed in the prospectus;
equals one-half if only the aggregate number of the Issuer’s shares owned by its directors and key officers
must be disclosed in the prospectus; equals zero when the ownership of Issuer’s shares by its directors and
key officers need not be disclosed in the prospectus.”
(4) Irregular contracts is “[a]n index of prospectus disclosure requirements regarding the Issuer’s contracts
outside the ordinary course of business. Equals one if the law or the listing rules require that the terms of
material contracts made by the Issuer outside the ordinary course of its business be disclosed in the
prospectus; equals one-half if the terms of only some material contracts made outside the ordinary course of
business must be disclosed; equals zero otherwise.”
(5) Transactions is “[a]n index of the prospectus disclosure requirements regarding transactions between the
Issuer and its directors, officers, and/or large shareholders (i.e., “related parties”). Equals one if the law or
the listing rules require that all transactions in which related parties have, or will have, an interest be
disclosed in the prospectus; equals one-half if only some transactions between the Issuer and related parties
must be disclosed in the prospectus; equals zero if transactions between the Issuer and related parties need
not be disclosed in the prospectus.” La Porta et al. (2003)
Accounting
Standards Index

The accounting index is a measure of the quality of accounting standards. The accounting index assigns a
rating to companies’ 1990 annual reports on the basis of their inclusion or exclusion of 90 items. The 90
items are divided into 7 categories (general information, income statements, balance sheets, funds flow
statement, accounting standards, stock data and special items). For each country, the index is based on
examination of a minimum of 3 companies. The companies represent a cross-section of various industries.
Seventy percent are industrial companies, while the remaining thirty percent are financial companies. La
Porta et al. (1998).

Perception of
Insider Trading

The perception of insider trading is based on a survey that asks corporate executives many questions,
including whether insider trading is common in their domestic stock markets. The variable ranges from one
to six, with one indicating that corporate executives strongly agree, and six indicating that corporate
executives strongly disagree, that insider trading is common in their domestic stock markets. World
Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report (1996).

Control Wedge

The control wedge is the difference between the controlling shareholder’s control rights and cash flow rights.
La Porta et al. (2002).

Original AntiDirector Rights
Index

The original anti-director rights index is “[f]ormed by adding 1 when: (1) the country allows shareholders to
mail the proxy vote to the firm, (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the general
shareholders’ meeting, (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities in the board of
directors is allowed, (4) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place, (5) the minimum percentage of share
capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an extraordinary shareholders meeting is less than or equal to 10
percent (the sample median), or (6) shareholders have preemptive rights that can be waived only by a
shareholders’ vote. The index ranges from zero to six.” La Porta et al. (1998).

Revised AntiDirector Rights
Index

The revised anti-director rights index “relies on the same basic dimensions of corporate law [as the original
anti-director rights index] but defines then with more precision.” “The general principle behind the
construction of the revised anti-director rights index is to associate better investor protection with laws that
explicitly mandate, or set as a default rule, provisions that are favorable to minority shareholders.” Djankov
et al. (2006)

Anti-SelfDealing Index

The average of the ex-ante and ex-post indices of the private control of self-dealing transactions. The index
of ex-ante control of self-dealing transactions is the “[a]verage of approval by disinterested shareholders and
ex-ante disclosure.” The index of ex-post control of self-dealing transactions is the “[a]verage of disclosure
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in periodic filings and ease of proving wrongdoing.” Djankov et al. (2006)
Measures of the
Market for
Corporate
Control

The three measures of the market for corporate control include: (1) the average percent of acquisitions that
were successful between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 1999; (2) the average per capita market value of
acquisitions in constant U.S. dollars between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 1999 divided by GDP in
1995 U.S. dollars; and (3) the average percent of acquisitions that were hostile between January 1, 1990 and
December 31, 1999. The corporate control data come from Bris (2005), whose “total sample includes all
takeover announcements that took place between 1 January 1990 and 31 December 1999, available in the
Securities Data Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions database. Only public companies are considered, and
[he] exclude[s] LBO deals, spinoffs, recapitalizations, self-tender and exchange offers, repurchases, minority
stake purchases, acquisitions of remaining interest, and privatizations. Second and subsequent bids that
occur within a window of four years relative to an initial announcement are excluded. A bid is considered
Hostile when the board officially rejects the offer but the acquiror persists with the takeover, or if the offer is
a surprise to the target’s board and the [board] has not yet given a recommendation. A deal is successful
when it has been either totally or partially completed” (Bris 2005, Table 1, p. 272). The GDP data come
from the World Bank World Development Report CD-Rom (2003).

Block Premium

The block premium is “the difference between the price per share paid for the control block and the price on
the Exchange two days after the announcement of the control transaction, divided by the price on the
Exchange after the announcement and multiplied by the proportion of cash flow rights represented in the
controlling block” (Dyck and Zingales 2004, p. 547). Dyck and Zingales (2004) estimate control block
premia for 39 countries using 393 controlling block sales between 1990 and 200.

Controlling
Shareholder’s
Identity

This variable is a dummy variable that represents the controlling shareholder’s identity: family, corporation,
financial institution, the state, a foreign state, or other. La Porta et al. 2002.
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Table 3 Means and Medians by Insider Trading Regime
The table reports means and medians of key variables by insider trading regime. Countries with a value of
ITL*Enforced that is greater than the median of two are classified as High ITL regimes, while those with a
value of ITL*Enforced that is less than or equal to two are classified as Low ITL regimes. N is the total
number of firms observed for each country; ITL is the index of insider trading law; Enforced equals one if
the country’s insider trading law was enforced at least once before 1994, and zero otherwise; Tobin’s Q is
Tobin’s Q from La Porta et al. (2002); Cash Flow Ownership is the fraction of common equity owned by
the controlling shareholder from La Porta et al. (2002); and Sales Growth is the growth of sales, expressed
in percentage terms, from La Porta et al. (2002). All variables are described in detail in Table 2. The
superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
N

All Countries
Mean
Median
Low ITL Regimes
Australia
Mean
Median
Austria
Mean
Median
Denmark
Mean
Median
Germany
Mean
Median
Greece
Mean
Median
Ireland
Mean
Median
Italy
Mean
Median
Japan
Mean
Median
Mexico
Mean
Median
New Zealand
Mean
Median
Norway
Mean
Median
Portugal
Mean

ITL

Enfor
ced

ITL*
Enforce
d

Tobin’s
Q

Cash Flow
Ownership

Sales
Growth

3.22
3

0.55
1

1.84
2

1.56
1.30

0.29
0.24

0.15
0.12

4
4

0
0

0
0

1.41
1.37

0.25
0.28

0.15
0.15

2
2

0
0

0
0

1.17
1.12

0.47
0.51

0.13
0.09

3
3

0
0

0
0

1.92
1.50

0.30
0.27

0.16
0.11

3
3

0
0

0
0

1.41
1.19

0.30
0.27

0.12
0.07

2
2

0
0

0
0

1.98
1.67

0.48
0.53

0.25
0.22

4
4

0
0

0
0

1.31
1.29

0.29
0.18

0.15
0.13

3
3

0
0

0
0

1.10
1.03

0.35
0.30

0.13
0.07

2
2

1
1

2
2

1.66
1.33

0.25
0.16

0.02
0.01

1
1

0
0

0
0

1.65
1.64

0.36
0.34

0.09
-0.04

4
4

0
0

0
0

1.53
1.33

0.24
0.23

0.17
0.17

1
1

1
1

1
1

1.36
1.14

0.27
0.23

0.16
0.14

4

0

0

1.20

0.46

0.24

537

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20

20
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Median
Spain
Mean
Median
Switzerland
Mean
Median
Low ITL Overall
Mean
Median
High ITL Regimes
Argentina
Mean
Median
Belgium
Mean
Median
Canada
Mean
Median
Finland
Mean
Median
France
Mean
Median
Hong Kong
Mean
Median
Israel
Mean
Median
Netherlands
Mean
Median
Singapore
Mean
Median
South Korea
Mean
Median
Sweden
Mean
Median
United Kingdom
Mean
Median
United States
Mean
Median
High ITL Overall
Mean
Median
Difference of Means
Low ITL vs. High ITL

4

0

0

1.09

0.51

0.20

4
4

0
0

0
0

1.18
1.16

0.26
0.21

0.09
0.05

3
3

0
0

0
0

1.71
1.34

0.34
0.35

0.15
0.11

2.86
3

0.14
0

0.21
0

1.47
1.27

0.33
0.29

0.14
0.10

3
3

1
1

3
3

1.25
1.15

0.39
0.39

0.15
0.13

3
3

1
1

3
3

1.33
1.22

0.29
0.29

0.14
0.09

5
5

1
1

5
5

1.97
1.75

0.25
0.16

0.18
0.17

3
3

1
1

3
3

1.17
1.10

0.30
0.23

0.16
0.15

4
4

1
1

4
4

1.38
1.27

0.02
0.18

0.10
0.08

3
3

1
1

3
3

1.49
1.16

0.32
0.27

0.16
0.11

3
3

1
1

3
3

1.27
1.17

0.24
0.19

0.16
0.13

3
3

1
1

3
3

2.06
1.74

0.33
0.26

0.18
0.13

4
4

1
1

4
4

1.76
1.55

0.31
0.29

0.23
0.26

5
5

1
1

5
5

1.14
1.07

0.18
0.17

0.19
0.21

3
3

1
1

3
3

1.45
1.21

0.12
0.07

0.18
0.16

3
3

1
1

3
3

2.15
1.72

0.14
0.12

0.12
0.10

5
5

1
1

5
5

2.98
3.08

0.20
0.17

0.12
0.10

3.61
3

1
1

3.61
3

1.65
1.31

0.26
0.19

0.16
0.13

-0.76a

-0.86a

-3.40a

-0.18a

0.07a

-0.02c

20

20

280

19

20

20

20

20

20

19

20

20

19

20

20

20

257
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(t-statistic)
Difference of Medians
0.34

533.00a

.

0.82

18.30a

6.05a

Low ITL vs. High ITL
(Chi2 statistic)
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Table 4: Means by Legal Origin
The table reports means and medians of key variables by legal origin, common law or civil law. N is the
total number of firms observed for each legal origin; ITL is the index of insider trading law; Enforced
equals one if the country’s insider trading law was enforced at least once before 1994, and zero otherwise;
Tobin’s Q is Tobin’s Q from La Porta et al. (2002); Cash Flow Ownership is the fraction of common equity
owned by the controlling shareholder from La Porta et al. (2002); and Sales Growth is the growth of sales,
expressed in percentage terms, from La Porta et al. (2002). All variables are described in detail in Table 2.
The superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

Common Law
Civil Law
Difference of Means
Civil Law vs.
Common Law
(t-statistic)

N

ITL

Enfor
ced

Tobin’s
Q

0.50
0.25

ITL*
Enforce
d
1.49
2.55

179
358

2.88
1.77
-1.01a

Sales
Growth

1.45
1.77

Cash
Flow
Ownership
0.25
0.32

-0.17a

-1.07a

1.56a

0.07a

-0.02

0.14
0.16
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Table 5: Correlation Matrix
This table presents pairwise correlation coefficients for Tobin’s Q, the insider trading law and enforcement
measures (ITL, Enforced, and ITL*Enforced), Cash Flow Ownership and Sales Growth. All variables are
described in detail in Table 2. The numbers in parentheses are the probability levels (p-values) at which the
null hypothesis of zero correlation can be rejected in two-tailed tests. The superscripts a, b, and c denote
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
ITL
ITL

Enforc
ed

ITL*
Enforced

Tobin’s
Q

Cash
Flow
Ownership

Sales
Growth

1.00

Enforced

0.12a
(0.01)

1.00

ITL*
Enforced

0.45a
(0.00)

0.90a
(0.00)

1.00

Tobin’s Q

0.09b
(0.05)

0.11a
(0.01)

0.17a
(0.00)

1.00

Cash Flow
Ownership

-0.15a
(0.00)

-0.19a
(0.00)

-0.20a
(0.00)

0.04
(0.38)

1.00

Sales
Growth

0.12a
(0.01)

0.02
(0.68)

0.05
(0.28)

0.23a
(0.00)

0.06
(0.18)

1.00
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Table 6: Random Effects Regressions
The table presents random effects regressions for the dependent variable, Log(1+Tobin’s Q), where Tobin’s
Q is adjusted by industry, as described in Table 2. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All
variables are described in detail in Table 2.
Panel A
Dependent Variable: Log(1+Tobin’s Q)

Independent
Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Sales Growth

0.69a
(0.13)
0.01
(0.04)

0.69a
(0.14)

0.68a
(0.14)

0.68a
(0.14)
0.00
(0.05)

H1
ITL
H2
Cash Flow
Ownership
H3
Cash Flow
Ownership *
ITL
Constant
Number of
Observations
χ2
Prob > χ2

0.15c
(0.09)

0.04
(0.31)
0.05c
(0.03)

0.04
(0.09)

-0.02
(0.15)
538

-0.04
(0.06)
538

-0.04
(0.05)
538

-0.05
(0.18)
538

25.39

28.46

28.69

28.70

a

a

0.00

0.00

a

0.00

a

0.00

Panel B
Dependent Variable: Log(1+Tobin’s Q)

Independent
Variable

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Sales Growth

0.68a
(0.14)
0.03
(0.02)

0.68a
(0.13)

0.68a
(0.14)

0.68a
(0.14)
0.03
(0.03)
0.12
(0.13)

0.06b
(0.03)

0.02
(0.05)

H1
ITL*Enforced
H2
Cash Flow
Ownership
H3
Cash Flow
Ownership*
ITL*Enforced
Constant
Number of
Observations
Χ2
Prob > χ2

0.15c
(0.09)

-0.05
(0.06)
537

-0.04
(0.06)
537

-0.03
(0.05)
537

-0.09
(0.08)
537

26.85

28.34

29.28

30.59

a

0.00

a

0.00

a

0.00

a

0.00
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Table 7: Random Effects Regressions (Heterogeneity)
The table presents random effects regressions for the dependent variable, Log(1+Tobin’s Q), where Tobin’s
Q is adjusted by industry, as described in Table 2. C_ITL is mean-centered ITL, i.e., the difference between
the country’s ITL and the world mean of ITL. Superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. All variables are described in detail in Table 2.
Dependent Variable: Log(1+Q)
Independent Variable
(1)
Sales Growth
(2)
C_ITL
(3)
C_ITL*Enforced
(4)
C_ITL*Common Law
(5)
C_ITL*Enforced*Common Law
(6)
Cash Flow Ownership
(7)
Cash Flow Ownership*Common Law
(8)
Cash Flow Ownership*C_ITL
(9)
Cash Flow Ownership*C_ITL*
Common Law
(10)
Cash Flow Ownership*Enforced*C_ITL
(11)
Cash Flow Ownership*
C_ITL*Enforced*Common Law
(12)
Common Law
(13)
Constant
Number of Observations
Χ2
Prob > χ2

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.69a
(0.13)
-0.09
(0.06)

0.70a
(0.13)
-0.09c
(0.06)

0.69a
(0.14)

0.69a
(0.14)

-0.07
(0.07)

-0.08
(0.07)

0.30a
(0.11)
0.17c
(0.10)
-0.15
(0.18)

0.27b
(0.11)
0.21b
(0.10)
-0.28
(0.21)

0.04
(0.05)
0.02
(0.07)

0.04
(0.05)
0.02
(0.07)

-0.08
(0.05)
537
42.42
0.00a

0.12
(0.10)
-0.12b
(0.06)
537
43.74
0.00a

0.28a
(0.11)

0.17
(0.11)
-0.27
(0.21)
0.02
(0.12)
0.28
(0.25)

-0.10c
0.05
537
41.03
0.00a

0.22c
(0.12)
0.20c
(0.11)
-0.41c
(0.25)
0.03
(0.12)
0.35
(0.26)

0.13
(0.12)
-0.13b
(0.06)
537
42.19
0.00a
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Table 8: Random Effects Regressions (Robustness)
The table presents random effects regressions for the dependent variable, Log(1+Tobin’s Q), where Tobin’s
Q is adjusted by industry, as described in Table 2. C_ITL is mean-centered ITL, i.e., the difference between
the country’s ITL and the world mean of ITL. Industry Adjusted Sales Growth is the difference between the
firm’s sales growth and the world median sales growth among firms in the same industry. CountryAdjusted Cash Flow Ownership is the difference between the controlling shareholder’s cash flow
ownership and mean cash flow ownership for all firms in the country. Standard errors are reported in
parentheses. Superscripts a, b, and c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. All variables are described in detail in Table 2.
Dependent Variable: Log(1+Q)
Independent Variable
(1)
Industry-Adjusted Sales Growth
(2)
C_ITL
(3)
C_ITL*Enforced
(4)
C_ITL*Common Law
(5)
C_ITL*Enforced*Common Law
(6)
Country-Adjusted Cash Flow Ownership
(7)
Country-Adjusted Cash Flow
Ownership*Common Law
(8)
Country-Adjusted Cash Flow
Ownership*C_ITL
(9)
Country-Adjusted Cash Flow
Ownership*C_ITL*Common Law
(10)
Country-Adjusted Cash Flow
Ownership*Enforced*C_ITL
(11)
Country-Adjusted Cash Flow
Ownership*C_ITL*Enforced*Common Law
(12)
Common Law
(13)
Industry Dummies
(14)
Constant
Number of Observations
Χ2
Prob > χ2

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.84a
(0.14)
-0.09b
(0.04)

0.84a
(0.14)
-0.09b
(0.04)

0.83a
(0.14)

0.83a
(0.14)

-0.06
(0.06)

-0.06
(0.06)

0.23b
(0.10)
0.22b
(0.11)
-0.29
(0.20)

0.21b
(0.11)
0.22b
(0.11)
-0.30
(0.20)

0.18
(0.18)

0.19
(0.18)

0.08
(0.28)

0.08
(0.28)

Yes

0.06
(0.09)
Yes

Yes

0.05
(0.08)
Yes

0.00
0.07
520
53.28
0.00a

-0.01
(0.07)
520
53.71
0.00a

0.03
(0.06)
520
53.12
0.00a

0.01
(0.07)
520
53.43
0.00a

0.22a
(0.09)

0.19b
(0.10)

0.22b
(0.11)
-0.37
(0.25)

0.22b
(0.11)
-0.38
(0.25)

0.06
(0.12)

0.06
(0.12)

0.19
(0.26)

0.20
(0.26)
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